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 Introduction
When the Arab Spring began in Tunisia, events there had immediate 
reverberations on neighbouring Algeria, as scholars enthused about the 
prospect of civil society-driven democratization. However, the Algerian 
public and ruling elites were much more sceptical about the unfold-
ing events. Two factors indicated that change would not come quickly to 
Algeria: the legacy of the civil war of the 1990s and the availability of 
revenues from natural resources that could be used to buy off potential 
dissent (Volpi 2013).
How the Algerian ruling elites employ oil and gas rents to control 
society has been explored in several studies over the course of three 
decades (Garon 1994; Entelis 1999; Aissaoui 2001; Darbouche 2011). 
The policy of control has also had unintended consequences that have 
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made decisions about the use, distribution and effects of rents 
 controversial topics of public discussion. This chapter focuses on a dif-
ferent, but relevant, expression of civil engagement far from the main-
stream understanding of civil society as being synonymous with NGOs. 
This is in line with recent findings in Middle East Studies which, after 
the uprisings, have called for a broadening of the understanding of ‘civil 
activism’ to include apparently non-political activities that nevertheless 
contribute to putting the spotlight on governmental choices and poli-
cies (Aarts and Cavatorta 2013). Civil engagement in Algeria represents 
a clear example of ‘upgrading authoritarianism’: the ability of incum-
bent regimes to implement liberalizing measures without genuinely 
democratizing (Heydemann 2007; see also Overland 2012). Such 
upgraded authoritarianism entails unintended consequences that need 
to be taken into consideration, particularly in light of their longer-term 
transformative potential.
This chapter begins by briefly reviewing the constraints on civil activ-
ism and engagement in the country. It then turns to the views voiced by 
the public concerning how natural resources are managed in Algeria. 
Here we distinguish between government institutions, political parties, 
research institues, media, and finally citizen mobilization. In a setting 
where civil society and public debate are controlled, different types of 
mobilization function as ‘venues’ where members of the public can 
express their views. For analytical purposes, we will distinguish between 
violent and non-violent mobilization. Finally, we discuss the implications 
of the analysis for the future of state–society relations in Algeria as regards 
the issue of hydrocarbons.
 Civil Engagement Under Authoritarian 
Constraints in Algeria and the Role of Natural 
Resources
Algeria’s civil society is a clear example of the difference between civil 
activism and genuine pluralism (Jamal 2007). The country presents an 
apparently lively civil society—the official number of national associations 
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stands at 1027 and the number of local associations is over 92,000 (ICNL 
2014). There is a considerable degree of associational life with advocacy 
groups working on human-rights-related issues, active in the charity sector 
as partners in the development of public policies and generally scrutiniz-
ing the authorities. In addition, the Algerian press is freer than in most 
other Arab countries, although it still scores poorly on the freedom of the 
press index (Reporters and Frontiers 2014). Finally, there is a pluralistic 
party system with parties of all ideological persuasions competing in regu-
lar elections.
On the other hand, Algeria also has a stagnant authoritarian political 
system with a high level of corruption (Transparency International 2014). 
The president has modified the constitution twice in order to be re- 
elected and non-elected members of the intelligentsia and security ser-
vices dominate policymaking. Moreover, the powerful repressive apparatus 
has been reinforced with the hiring of new policemen and security agents, 
made possible by the boom in oil and gas revenues. Thus, as Amnesty 
International (2014) concludes:
[D]espite emergency law having been lifted in 2011, freedom of expres-
sion, association and assembly are still restricted. Although Algeria is an oil 
producer, social and economic problems continue to plague the country 
and are enhanced by corruption, increasing living costs, high unemploy-
ment and housing crisis.
According to the International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law, while 
civil society organizations exist in significant numbers, ‘the new Law 
on Associations of 2012 created additional restrictions on the freedom 
of association, and generally fails to protect the right in line with 
Algeria’s international obligations’ (ICNL 2014). Furthermore, as for-
mer Minister of Communication and Government Spokesperson 
Abdelaziz Rahabi has argued, ‘today’s civil society … is the direct ema-
nation of the state. It does not have any critical stance when it comes 
to government policy’ (Imadalou 2015). Finally, there is very little 
meaningful political participation in elections because they are believed 
to be of no real consequence. Unsurprisingly, some scholars refer to 
Algeria as a ‘bunker state’ where all important decisions are the out-
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come of shady processes of intra-elite negotiations—between generals, 
intelligence officers, high-ranking bureaucrats and key politicians—
without meaningful influence from political parties or civil society 
organizations (Henry 2004).
The capability of the Algerian regime to tolerate civil society while 
disempowering it is related to the role that natural resources play in 
strengthening the ruling elite and upholding the status quo. The avail-
ability of hydrocarbon rents makes possible the control of shifting 
balances of power in society and rewarding some social groups to the 
detriment of others (Haddad 2011; Achcar 2013). A major problem 
is that the way in which the revenues are distributed is entirely opaque. 
Societal and political actors, such as business associations, trade 
unions or established political parties, are often reluctant to speak 
out—either because they fear repression or because they also derive 
benefits from the redistribution of hydrocarbon revenues. A 2014 
article in the newspaper El Watan underlined how business associa-
tions, traditionally seen as crucial actors in promoting political trans-
parency, had in fact sided with the regime from the early 2000s to the 
present day:
[T]he FCE (Forum of CEOs) headed by Redha Hamiani supported all of 
Bouteflika’s decisions. He even supported Bouteflika’s candidacy in the 
2004 and 2008 presidential elections. All of the other business associations 
followed the FCE on this. There has been very little criticism of economic 
policy during the last fifteen years. Algerian business leaders have been 
incapable, during this time, to develop a powerful advocacy role and have 
refused to adopt a discourse that opposes the decisions made and proposes 
alternatives. (El Watan 2014)
There is therefore very little advocacy in oil politics in Algeria, even though 
the people are aware that revenues are misspent or misappropriated.
However, despite the strength of the mechanisms of co-optation and 
repression, public opinion is far from subservient. While dissenting or 
critical opinions have not yet led to attempts at removing the current 
regime, they highlight the existence of a fragile but important plurality of 
voices on how oil and gas rents should be managed.
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 Public Opinion and the Natural Resources 
Industry: Dissonant Voices
In Algeria, discordant voices about governance-related issues have 
emerged from time to time despite the heavy-handed nature of Algerian 
authoritarianism. As the French-Algerian scholar Amel Boubekeur 
(2014) has observed:
[The absence of ] an Arab Spring-style uprising against Bouteflika in 2011 
does not mean that contestation has disappeared. Disillusioned Algerians 
reject the binary opposition of revolution or pseudo-democracy. They are 
increasingly resorting to demonstrations, riots, sit-ins, protest marches, 
uprisings, strikes, hunger strikes, and even self-immolations; in so doing 
they are aiming less to overthrow the regime than to create leverage for 
negotiations.
The clientelistic nature of redistribution creates discontents, which can 
then adopt various forms of engagement to debate how the hydrocarbons 
sector should be managed, how the money should be spent, as well as the 
consequences—economic, political or societal—of relying on such an 
industry. Although these forms of engagement have not turned into coor-
dinated campaigns for political change at the national level, there are 
numerous loci of discussion—and even revolt—with which the regime 
must contend (Dahou 2015).
 Research Institutes, Political Parties 
and Organizations and the Hydrocarbons 
Sector
Although certain quarters have questioned the genuine autonomy of the 
research institutes that are part of public discussion about the state and 
future of the country, some of these think-tanks have begun to affect the 
way in which economic and political elites reflect on policymaking. 
NABNI is a think-tank founded in 2011 with the purpose of ‘beginning 
a new era between government policy-making and its relations to citizens 
2 Algeria: Oil and Public Opinion 
28 
with a view to implement the rule of law’ (NABNI 2015e). While the 
bulk of the institute’s work involves promoting political reforms to 
enhance democracy and individual freedoms, it also takes up issues 
related to economic policymaking because it wants to promote a type of 
economic development ‘disconnected from hydrocarbons rents’ (NABNI 
2015e). NABNI is active in promoting its own positions in the public 
domain through conferences and other open events that provide credibil-
ity and visibility. NABNI’s work is given significant coverage in the 
Huffington Post Algeria and other media outlets. In February 2015, 
NABNI published a policy report in the national press denouncing the 
lack of proper governmental reactions to the falling oil price:
[T]he status quo is no longer tenable. The FRR – Fonds de Régulation des 
Recettes [sovereign wealth fund] will dry out around 2017 … the currency 
reserves as well. The balance of payment has been negative since 2014 and all 
efforts at economic diversification have failed. The business climate has been 
deteriorating rapidly and foreign investments are in decline. In addition, it is 
likely that by 2020 there will be no gas left to export. (NABNI 2015a)
The NABNI report follows up this criticism of government policy and 
the inability of the ruling elites to think differently about oil and gas rents 
with its own plan for how Algeria should react and the types of policies it 
should adopt with a view to long-term development (NABNI 2015b).
A crucial issue in this action plan is management of the sovereign 
wealth fund, created in 2000 to manage the surplus derived from the 
export of oil and gas. In particular, NABNI advises the government to 
put to use the money amassed in the sovereign wealth fund, rather than 
saving it. In a context where the oil price continues to fall, but the sover-
eign wealth fund is still in good shape, the government’s reaction has 
been to stop investing sovereign wealth fund money, in order to make 
savings. That is what NABNI criticizes (NABNI 2015c):
[T]his is precisely the mistake made in 1985: public investments were 
halted, consumption and redistribution were paid for by contracting 
debt and reforms were delayed. It was the easy thing to do: delay the 
shock through a reduction in expenses while leaving the rentier system 
untouched.
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On the contrary, according to NABNI, ‘it is important to identify the 
necessary short-term reforms to enable the country to create the condi-
tions for exiting the rentier system’ (NABNI 2015c). Proposed reforms 
include decreasing the fiscal burden on private companies in order to 
attract FDI, reducing state support to public institutions and private 
enterprises to increase their activity and value on the market, and reduc-
ing public subsidies for energy prices and consumption (NABNI 2015d).
Another think-tank particularly active in proposing alternative eco-
nomic policies to those currently in place is the Cercle d’action et de 
réflexion autour de l’entreprise (CARE). It organizes public events, dis-
cussing the transformation of the Algerian economy to make it less 
dependent on the energy market through use of the surplus created by 
that same market. In particular, as pointed out by Abdeldjellil Bouzidi, 
lecturer at la Sorbonne Nouvelle invited to Algiers for a debate on the 
Algerian sovereign wealth fund, the surplus accumulated should be used 
to stimulate private, innovative and competitive enterprises, to enable a 
deep-going reform of the whole national economic system (CARE 2015). 
In April 2015, CARE organized another public conference in Algiers 
focusing on public–private partnerships as a potential solution to declin-
ing state revenues due to decreasing oil prices (CARE 2015).
However, the state and its budget seem to be differently oriented. The 
2015 budget, for instance, anticipated USD 110 billion in spending, of 
which more than half would be used to cover expenses for running public 
institutions, a cost that is rising quickly. From 2014 to 2015, public 
expenditure rose by 14% (Taleb 2014). This expenditure is financed 
mainly by the sovereign wealth fund. Against this backdrop, NABNI has 
expressed its disillusionment with a budget law that has failed to break 
with the past, and has denounced the government for perpetuating an 
economic model based on a rentier economy instead of engaging in the 
changes that would allow Algeria to disentangle itself from such a rentier 
system. In a declaration released in April 2015, NABNI called on the 
government to ‘free the economy from the dependency on rents in order 
to finally break with the rentier excesses that fuel an ephemeral wealth’ 
(Rondeleux 2014).
Think-tanks proposing neo-liberal reforms and cuts to public expen-
diture are not alone in voicing concerns and discontent with the man-
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agement of the sovereign wealth fund. The economic reforms proposed 
by both NABNI and CARE are very much in line with the ‘structural 
reforms’ promoted by international financial organizations such as the 
World Bank. Also political parties have criticized the government—
especially over issues of transparency. On the occasion of the presenta-
tion of the 2014 budgetary law and the parliamentary discussions on it, 
deputies of the Front des Forces Socialistes (FFS), a social-democratic 
party and the second largest opposition party in the parliament, 
demanded that the government report on the opaque management of 
the sovereign wealth fund. In particular, the government should detail 
how funds of the sovereign wealth fund have been included in the 
annual financial bill (budget law) and how they have been spent. 
According to the deputies, it was not clear how that money had been 
invested (Le Soir d’Algérie 2014).
In addition to political parties, state institutions have begun to voice 
their opinion on the management of Algeria’s economy and, conse-
quently, oil and gas rents. While such institutions do not necessarily 
fall into the category of ‘civil society organizations’, their public inter-
ventions are important insofar as they indicate that there is some 
debate around this issue, also within the ruling elites. While the regime 
has been able to ignore demands for radical change coming from out-
side its own ranks, diverging opinions exist within the elite itself on 
the possible impact of falling oil prices on the broader national eco-
nomic system.
In December 2014, the governor of the Central Bank, Mohamed 
Laksaci, transmitted a message to the parliament that diverged from the 
government’s official position on the presumed capacity of the sovereign 
wealth fund to cover the state deficit. The oil-price collapse in 2014–2016 
limited the availability of a rent surplus, opening a new scenario in which 
an entirely new economic plan would be needed (Huff Post Maghreb 
2014). Mohamed-Seghir Babès, president of the Conseil National 
Économique et Social (CNES, a permanent administrative body of the 
state) also voiced similar concerns and called for a reduction in public 
subsidies and in favour of a better planned, better targeted subsidy reform 
which could reach those who are really in need of state support (Huff Post 
Maghreb 2014). Even within the government, this view would find sup-
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porters. As reported in the political magazine Jeune Afrique, former 
Minister of Finance Abdellatif Benachenhou does not endorse the views 
of President Bouteflika regarding economic policy (Alilat 2015).
Such discussions have been going on for several years, with media, 
opinion-makers and state institutions debating the management of the 
sovereign wealth fund and the need to reduce state dependence on oil 
and gas rents. A serious political confrontation that crystallized this 
debate occurred during the parliamentary debates on the 2015 finan-
cial bill. One-third of the national assembly boycotted the debate on 
the financial bill, dissatisfied with how the government had ignored 
the views of opposition parties that had called for tighter control over 
the use of funds from the sovereign wealth fund to cover state expenses. 
For instance, Yahia Bouklal (Front des Forces Socialistes, FFS) declared 
that ‘what is really worrying is that the deficit persists’ and then asked 
rhetorically: ‘when will the FRR [sovereign wealth fund] be drained?’ 
The Rassemblement National Démocratique party also called for a 
rethinking of public expenses (Algerie Press Service 2015). Despite the 
intensity of the parliamentary confrontation, the law was approved in 
November 2014. The journalist Cherif Ali (2015), writing in the daily 
Le Matin, put forth the hypothesis that an agreement between the gov-
ernment and members of parliament, including opposition deputies, 
had been struck to secure approval of the budget. Indeed, before vot-
ing on the budget, deputies had voted for an increase in their pensions 
and the possibility to access funding and accommodation at privileged 
rates and with no taxation. According to Ali, that was merely the most 
recent case demonstrating the unaccountability of the elected 
representatives.
This type of reporting and criticism of the political system is wide-
spread in Algeria, largely because the security services do not seem to 
consider it particularly dangerous, as few people read the newspapers or 
are very interested in politics. Moreover, most members of the public are 
already fully aware of the shortcomings of the system. Still, when research 
institutes, key figures within the establishment and journalists debate 
and/or cover issues related to economic policymaking and, notably, 
dependence on oil and gas, their arguments do have an impact on public 
opinion.
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 Mobilization of Citizens
In such a context, it is not surprising that diverse citizens’ initiatives have 
been increasingly evident in public life. Civil activism includes more than 
the lobbying activities of NGOs, research institutes and political parties 
as described above. In fact, ordinary members of the public have been 
mobilizing for some time through increasingly radical and confronta-
tional means.
In January 2013, the Algerian government authorized the exploitation of 
shale gas in order to increase revenues from the hydrocarbons sector. This 
happened in a very opaque manner, with no public debate, and the poten-
tial negative aspects of such a decision were not openly discussed 
(Hamouchene et al. 2013). By 2014, the plan for exploiting Algerian shale 
gas succeeded in attracting the interest of some of the world’s major oil and 
gas companies, including Eni, ExxonMobil, GDF Suez and Total. In 2014, 
Algeria announced plans for USD 70 billion in investments in shale-gas 
extraction, as prices for the country’s main export, crude oil, fell to a 6-year 
low and demand for gas in Europe, Algeria’s largest client, significantly 
dropped. In early July 2014, the government announced the drilling of four 
shale-gas wells in the Illizi Basin (in southeastern Algeria) and the Ahnet 
Basin (in southwestern Algeria) by the end of the year (Nield 2014).
The project drew criticism from the start, for several reasons. First, it 
appears that only a small proportion of the field is likely to prove com-
mercially viable. Industry expert and former senior official at the energy 
ministry, Ali Kefaifi, estimated in 2014 that out of 20 trillion cubic 
metres of recoverable shale-gas reserves, only 2–4 trillion cubic metres 
would be commercially viable (The Economist 2014). Second, there are 
several issues concerning the logistical infrastructure necessary for 
exploiting the reserves, extending the web of wells that would need to 
be drilled. This investment might also prove misplaced: uncertain gas 
prices might not justify the investment; with the recent discovery of 
several gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean and Tanzania, gas prices 
could become significantly lower (Nakhle 2015). Finally, fracking and 
shale-gas extraction have significant environmental costs (Overland 
2015). The chemicals that are used in the process could have a pollut-
ing effect on aquifers. Additionally, the use of large volumes of water is 
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essential to the extraction process—a point of great concern to many 
Algerians, who already have limited access to water and who see this 
technique as a waste of a precious resource. Algeria’s independent media 
and members of the opposition have highlighted the financial and 
environmental risks involved, and this aspect has been crucial in moti-
vating the protest movement that has been taking shape in the 
country.
In many ways, popular mobilization in southern Algeria against the 
development of shale gas represents a first in the country’s political his-
tory: traditional channels of communication with decision-makers in 
the capital have been bypassed in favour of direct action. This is particu-
larly the case in Ain Salah, a town close to the proposed test-drilling 
sites. In December 2014, when the government announced the drilling 
of the first shale-gas well in the town, with no prior notice, protests 
broke out in the nearby communities of Ouargla, Illizi, Ghardaia, 
Timimoun, Adrar, Bordj Badji Mokhtar, Oum El Bouaghi, Bejaia, Ain 
Beida and Ain Salah itself. In solidarity with protestors in Algeria, 
migrants and diaspora communities mobilized in Europe as well 
(Platform London 2013). In addition, Algerian communities suffering 
from the negative environmental and social effects of the existing hydro-
carbon industry started organizing to put pressure on the authorities to 
address these issues, linking them with the newer protests against pro-
posed fracking. For instance, a plea for a moratorium on fracking, 
signed by members of the anti-fracking group ‘Non aux Gaz de Schiste’, 
was submitted to the president on 19 February 2015. The journalist 
Rachida Larmi (2015) commented:
The plea was more of a dossier than an open citizens’ letter, containing 
precise and informed data, overwhelming evidence in photographs proving 
existing pollution affecting the health of the indigenous population and 
local environment, and major failures in post-drilling protocols through 
blatant and total disregard of health and environmental regulations.
According to Yaqin Husamuddin (2015), an Algerian journalist, 
the protest movement against shale gas shows that something has 
changed in the self-perception of the people of southern Algeria. He 
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highlights two main factors: the boom in Algerian independent media 
outlets and social networking sites, which have helped to unveil the 
misdeeds of the authorities and make it possible for people to connect 
with each other, especially in areas under-represented in the main-
stream media, and the rapid rise in educational levels, especially in 
southern Algeria.
Although these protests have taken place mainly in the southern part 
of the country, they represent a concern for the national authorities: not 
only might they exacerbate the north–south divide, but they might also 
drive broader criticism against the government, with demands for more 
transparent energy policies. An article by Nidam Abdi (2015) for the 
French online news service Les Echos observed that in Ain Salah, ‘the 
movement created in opposition to the exploitation of shale gas is a 
political earthquake in a country used to see hydrocarbons politics made 
exclusively by and for the ruling elites and its clients in industry’. In 
fact, apart from environmental concerns and possible anti-colonial feel-
ings (the major exploiter is the French company Total, and in France 
fracking methods have been banned due to environmental concerns), 
there is also resentment against the north and the management of the 
revenue generated by natural resources. Local residents have declared, 
‘the south has the cow but the north has the milk’, revealing deep dis-
content over the absence of genuine wealth redistribution (Gall 2015). 
As Ghilès (2015) put it, ‘what Algerians are debating is the quality of 
governance, the accountability of those who run Algeria and the trans-
parency of official policy’.
Southern Algeria has been seen by the northern part of the country as 
a mere reservoir of natural resources, and lack of consideration for those 
living in the south has resulted in a lack of investment in southern cities, 
where infrastructure has remained underdeveloped. As reported by the 
Middle Eastern online news service Al Monitor, a member of the environ-
mental committee in Ain Salah told the daily El Watan in January 2015: 
‘we neither benefited from traditional gas nor from petrol proceeds. Shale 
gas will deprive us of the little good that we have left’, namely, the water 
underground and the possibility of continuing with desert agriculture 
(Tamlali 2015).
P. Rivetti and F. Cavatorta
 35
Despite the protests, the government decided to carry on with the 
shale-gas project, once again highlighting the limits of civil activism in 
what remains an authoritarian country. The only thing the protesters 
achieved was that the Prime Minister Sellal announced that the plan 
would apparently not be implemented until 2022 (Middle East Eye 
Staff 2015). The protests in the south are important also because they 
complement the engagement of more formal institutions and civil 
society actors in hydrocarbons policy in the country. However, the 
resilience of the country's authoritarian system does not seem to per-
mit the radical change that such actors demand, and that is necessary 
to lift the vast majority of Algerians out of poverty and social 
disenfranchisement.
On the other hand, the absence of change can make the mobiliza-
tion of the general public, which has remained largely peaceful thus far, 
more violent. For instance, the Algerian security forces intervened 
forcefully against members of the public who got close to an industrial 
facility owned by Halliburton to protest against drilling for shale gas 
(Gall 2015). More significantly, there was the case of the 2013 attack 
on the Tiguentourine gas facility, in the region of In Amenas in south-
eastern Algeria. The attack, followed by a hostage crisis during which 
some 40 people were killed—including several foreign oil company 
staff—was carried out by Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s al Qaeda in the 
Maghreb, in collaboration with local groups like Lamine Bencheneb’s 
Sons of Sahara for Islamic Justice. The Algerian military guarded the 
Tiguentourine plant, a joint venture between BP, Sonatrach and Statoil, 
accounting for 10% of Algeria’s natural gas production and generating 
revenues of approximately USD 5 million per day (Armstrong 2014). 
According to the Algerian journalist Yassin Tamlali (2015), this epi-
sode of violence is not disconnected from the political repression and 
material deprivation experienced in the south. Little oil revenue reaches 
this region, and political control is tight because of fears of unrest, to 
which the jihadist threat has now been added. Hannah Armstrong 
(2014), research fellow at the Institute of Current World Affairs, has 
advanced a similar view. She notes how the anti-fracking protest move-
ment in the south of Algeria has remained peaceful despite repression 
and how harsh living conditions are for the local Saharans. For this 
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reason, stifling a peaceful movement demanding financial transpar-
ency, environmental protection and sound economic management 
entails considerable risks.
 Conclusions
It would be difficult to argue that petroleum policymaking in Algeria is 
subject to extensive scrutiny on the part of social and civil actors, as the 
country exhibits all the features of a classic authoritarian rentier state 
(Luciani and Beblawi 1987). Decision-making processes on hydrocar-
bons policy and the distribution of rents remain non-transparent, and 
even elected representatives are excluded from the decision-making pro-
cess. At the same time, there are rising demands for greater participation 
in the opaque decision-making process because of the importance of oil 
and gas policy to society. Although they do not determine petroleum 
policy, Algeria’s civil society actors are increasingly capable of exerting 
some influence by employing a range of methods. Research institutes put 
forward alternative policy proposals through the media and organize 
activities such as public conferences, in the hope that a better-informed 
public and policymakers may improve the situation. Some political par-
ties and individuals within key institutions like the Central Bank appear 
to recognize the need for an overhaul of hydrocarbons policy and have 
started advancing their views more forcefully. However, pressure is com-
ing not only from more established actors and entities: citizen mobiliza-
tion is also increasingly significant. In particular, environmental and 
economic concerns over the exploitation of shale gas have fuelled pro-
tests across southern Algeria. While the government seems bent on refus-
ing to engage, there is concern that the protests might get out of hand 
and turn violent.
Like several Arab Gulf states, Algeria has managed to avoid the Arab 
Spring because of its ability to turn on the revenue tap and the effective-
ness of the security services in suppressing dissent. But employing rents 
to secure regime survival is not a long-term solution. Civil society actors 
offer criticism and alternatives that might provide for better manage-
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ment of the country’s hydrocarbon revenues. If they were to gain more 
 visibility and credibility, that would put them on a collision course with 
the authorities.
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